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The Federal Jurisdictional Armount and Rule 20
Joinder of Parties: Aggregation of Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
By statute, federal district courts have original jurisdiction
over actions based on the presence of a federal question1 or diver-
sity of citizenship2 only if the matter in controversy exceeds
$10,000. With some exceptions,3 courts in the past construed
this to mean that each party to an action must satisfy the
amount requirement before the district court could properly
exercise jurisdiction.4 If several plaintiffs were permitted to
join their claims in a common action, each was allowed to aggre-
gate the amounts of all claims against the defendant which he
possessed5 in order to attain the jurisdictional amount. He was
not, however, allowed to aggregate his claims with those of other
plaintiffs6 or to rely upon satisfaction of the statute by another
plaintiff.7 Those who could not meet these requirements were
dismissed and forced to pursue their remedies in state courts,
1. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
2. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
3. See note 54 infra, and accompanying text.
4. See notes 39-53 infra; 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND) PROCEDURE § 534 (Wright ed. 1961); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE f 0.97 (2d ed. 1964); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 36, at 102
(1963).
5. Crawford v. Neal, 144 U.S. 585 (1892); Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d
696 (10th Cir. 1940); Cashmere Valley Bank v. Pacific Fruit & Produce
Co., 33 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Wash. 1940). This is consistent with the lan-
guage of Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides that "a party . . . may join . . . as many claims . .. as he has
against an opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
6. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
7. Note that the term "aggregation" is a misnomer in the latter
context. The question is not whether the claims of A and B can be
aggregated, but whether A's satisfaction of the requirement can be used
by B. However, as the courts have applied the term to both situations
it will be similarly applied in this Note.
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regardless of whether other plaintiffs were retained in federal
court.8
The inflexible results of the early jurisdictional amount
cases created little controversy, since common law joinder was
rare. The adoption of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, provided a new and comparatively liberal
approach to joinder of parties, permitting it whenever the par-
ties possessed claims growing out of a unitary or serial transac-
tion or occurrence and involving common questions of law or
fact.9 Past judicial construction of the amount in controversy
statute, requiring that each party involved in the litigation
show the requisite amount, now appears to frustrate the Rule's
goal of litigating all issues arising from the same transaction
or occurrence in a single action, regardless of the number of par-
ties involved. Conversely, any attempt to achieve this goal
must ultimately conflict with the strict judicial construction of
the jurisdictional amount requirement. The question therefore
becomes which approach should prevail.
Since a growing number of courts are becoming disenchanted
with the traditional rules against aggregation and are placing
increased emphasis on the liberal purposes of the Rules,10 the
substance of the competing philosophies should be understood.
This Note will discuss the basic premises of both the joinder
Rule and the jurisdictional amount statute as well as the judicial
treatment of the conflict thus far. Based on this discussion,
suggestions for a reasonable solution to the conflict will be
proposed.
8. Aggregation difficulties may also rise in multiple-defendant
contexts, as where one or more plaintiffs bring an action against two
or more defendants. However, since the variation is generally of little
substantive import, a multiple-plaintiff model shall be used throughout.
9. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.
. A plaintiff.., need not be interested in obtaining.., all
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more
of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (a). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions).
10. See, e.g., Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235
(E.D. Mich. 1960); Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount Require-
ment and Joinder of Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
27 IND. L. Rnv. 199 (1952).
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II. TIE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
A. THE POLICY
1. The Federalism Rationale
One of the traditional rationales for the requirement of a
jurisdictional amount is that it preserves a distinction between
the jurisdictions of federal and state courts, thereby protecting
the independence of the latter.' During the debate over the
judiciary clause of the proposed Constitution,'12 there was fierce
controversy over the establishment of a federal judiciary and its
proper jurisdiction.' 3 Those who opposed a broad federal system
sought to include in the judiciary clause a jurisdictional amount
requirement 14 in order to "prevent an extension of the federal
jurisdiction, which may, and in all probability will, swallow up
the state jurisdictions. . . ."15 In order to save the clause, pro-
ponents of the federal judiciary agreed to this requirement,6
but succeeded in making the amount statutory rather than con-
11. It was intended both to reduce the danger of encroachment on
state court jurisdiction by the federal judiciary and to serve as a com-
promise between those who desired no federal judiciary and those who
wished to create a federal judiciary possessing all powers permissible
under the Constitution. Warren, New Light on the History of the Fed-
eral Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAxv. L. REV. 53-54 (1923).
12. U.S. CONST. art. IM, § 1, provides that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish .... Section 2. Thejudicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their author-
ity;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
13. See 1 W. CROSS=EY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HiS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES 610 (1953); Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HIv. L. REv. 483 (1928); Warren, supra note
11, at 49.
14. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 550-51 (1891).
15. Id. The Massachusetts convention submitted the following
proposal:
. . [t]he federal judicial powers shall not extend to any
actions between citizens of different states, when the matter in
dispute ... is not of the value of fifteen hundred dollars at
least.
1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 323 (1891). Maryland made a similar proposal.
2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 550-51 (1891).
16. Friendly, supra note 13, at 501.
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stitutional,17 and in reducing its size. Thus, although clearly
not required by the terms of the Constitution, 8 the Judiciary
Act of 178919 contained a $500 jurisdictional amount require-
ment for original jurisdiction.
The interrelationship between notions of federalism and the
jurisdictional amount requirement has continued to find expres-
sion.20 The author of the most recent jurisdictional amount
increase testified during committee hearings that the federal
courts must be restricted from leaving to "the government of
the States and localities nothing more than the hollow shells of
lost liberty."21
17. The evidence shows that a jurisdictional amount was included
in the original draft of the Act. F. WHARToN, STATE TRIALS OF TaE
UNITED STATES 38 (1849).
18. Cf. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4. Dall.) 8 (1799),
where the Court, speaking of Congressional restrictions on federal juris-
diction, said:
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal
courts derive their judicial power immediately from the con-
stitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judi-
cial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
congress. If congress has given the power to this court, we
possess it, not otherwise: and if congress has not given the
power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the legis-
lative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would,
perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, to every subject, in every form, which the constitu-
tion might warrant.
19. 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789).
20. In 1801 when the Federalists drastically altered the federal
judicial system to give federal courts more nearly their full constitu-
tional authority, the jurisdictional amount was retained. 2 Stat. 89
(1801). The amount was increased the following year when the Fed-
eralist alterations were eliminated. 2 Stat. 132 (1802). See F. FRANxc-
FuRTER & J. LANDIS, Tim BusINEss OF THE SuPvRA COURT 21 (1928);
1 C. WARREN, THE Su pREm COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 185 (1928).
The amount was increased to $2,000 in 1887, 24 Stat. 552 (1887), $3,000
in 1911, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911), and to the present $10,000 in 1958, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
21. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 on Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 5, at 3 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
1957 Hearing]. The committee which studied the possibility of change
in the jurisdictional amount rationalized the increase by stating that if
$3,000 was the smallest amount considered "substantial" in 1911, and
the consumer price index had increased by 152% since 1911, $7,500 was
more nearly "substantial" in 1958. S. REP. No. 1830, REPORT OF COM-
MITTEE ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE]; H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
18 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE]. The committee's recommenda-
tion was accepted, but the amount was increased to $10,000. See also
104 CONG. REc. 12687 (1958), where Congressman Keating explained the
increase as an attempt to equate $3,000 in 1911 with an amount in 1958,
thus retaining the same Congressional intent as in prior years.
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The Supreme Court has also taken a strong position on the
relationship between the jurisdictional amount and federalism:
[T]he jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been
narrowed by successive acts of Congress, which have progres-
sively increased the jurisdictional amount. The policy of the
statute calls for its strict construction. The power reserved to
the states, under the constitution, to provide for the determina-
tion of controversies in their courts may be restricted only by
the actions of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections
of the Constitution. Due regard for the rightful independence
of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, re-
quires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to
the precise limits which the statute has defined. 22
Thus, despite attacks by the commentators 23 neither Congress
nor the Courts have abandoned their belief in the role of the
jurisdictional amount as a device by which a political balance
between federal and state judicial powers can be achieved.24
2. The Log-Jam Rationale
Although originally conceived as a technique of safeguarding
state autonomy, the jurisdictional amount has recently been
cited as a method of stabilizing or even reducing the backlog of
22. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934). See also Gay v. Ruff, 292
U.S. 25, 36-37 (1934); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234
(1922); Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 578, 580 (1882). Chief Justice War-
ren, addressing the American Law Institute regarding the 1958 juris-
dictional changes, stated, "[i]t is essential that we achieve a properjurisdictional balance between the Federal and State court systems,
assigning to each system those cases most appropriate in the light of
the basic principles of federalism." 1959 AmAIcAN LAW INSTITUTE-
PROcEDiNras 27, 33.
23. See, e.g., Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limita-
tions on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 416-17 (1936); Note, supra
note 10, at 200.
24. Cf. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499, 500 (1928). In those cases
where Congress has recognized the need for direct federal jurisdiction,
the requirement of a jurisdictional amount has been expressly elimi-
nated. This has occurred so frequently in cases based on the existence
of a federal question that aggregation problems arise almost exclusively
in the context of diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1337,
cases arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce; § 1343,
civil rights cases; § 1357, personal injuries giving rise to claims under
federal law. Moreover, Congress has reacted to individual jurisdictional
amount decisions which it thought inequitable. See 50 U.S.C. § 459 (d)
(1964), giving federal courts jurisdiction over actions by servicemen to
retain civilian jobs, regardless of jurisdictional amount. The statute
was enacted in response to Christner v. Poudre Valley Cooperative
Ass'n, 134 F. Supp. 115 (D. Colo. 1955), which held that although plain-
tiff had a federal statutory right to retain his civilian position, the
statute failed to give the federal courts jurisdiction in absence of the
requisite jurisdictional amount.
[Vol. 53:94
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cases in federal courts. The so-called log-jam rationale gained
prominence in 1958 when Congress, in dealing with federal juris-
diction, became greatly concerned with the tremendous volume
of cases the federal courts were being asked to handle.25
While the effect of the jurisdictional amount requirement
on the number of cases brought in federal courts is undoubtedly
one of its current justifications, several factors indicate that
this rationale is not devoid of weaknesses. Congress itself has
recognized the limited utility of the requirement as a device to
reduce the volume of federal litigation. The committee recom-
mending the increase in 1958 admitted it did not believe that
"raising ... the jurisdictional amount would appreciably lessen
the load of work on the Federal courts."26 Similarly, the author
of the 1958 bill stated that when viewed as an attempt to reduce
the federal caseload "such a bill isn't worth the paper it is writ-
ten on."27 Moreover, prior statistics showed that increase would
have little effect,28 and this indication proved true.2 9 Further
25. In a further effort to relieve the situation [the heavy in-
crease in caseload] the Judicial Conference of the United States
in 1950 undertook to study the overall problem of jurisdiction
and venue and as a result made the following recommendations
which are incorporated in the present legislation:(3) that the jurisdictional amount prescribed by sections 1331
and 1332 . . . be raised from $3,000 to $10,000.
SENATE 3; HOUSE 2-3.
26. SENATE 22; HousE 19.
27. 1957 Hearing at 3. The optimistic language in the 1958 legis-
lative history concerning the reduction of the federal case load was
directed primarily at another change-that of limiting federal diversity
jurisdiction over corporations by providing that a corporation should be
deemed a citizen of both the state of its incorporation and its principal
place of business:
In adopting this legislation, the committee feels that it will
bring the minimum amount in controversy up to a reasonable
level by contemporary standards and that it will ease the work-
load of our Federal courts by reducing the number of cases
involving corporations which come into Federal district courts
on the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists.
SENATE 3; HOUSE 3 (emphasis added). The optimism was the result of
statistics indicating that in 1958, 62% of all diversity cases involved
corporations. SENATE 13; HOUSE 10.
28. In 1877 the amount was raised from $500 to $2,000, but the
volume of cases did not significantly decrease in subsequent years:
1876 11,366
1877 10,258
1878 11,501
1879 12,801
In 1911 the amount was raised to $3,000:
1910 10,618
1911 10,191
1912 12,992
1913 11,183
SENATE 23; HOUSE 20.
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doubt is cast on the validity of the log-jam rationale by the
general rule that the measure of the amount in controversy is
simply the amount claimed by the plaintiff.30 Although a chal-
lenge by the defendant will put the burden on plaintiff to show
that the amount claimed is reasonable, the burden is easily
satisfied.31 Thus, unless Congress drastically raised the re-
quired amount, plaintiffs will usually be able to inflate their
claims to meet the jurisdictional requirement.32
Despite the arguments discussed above, it is likely that rais-
ing the jurisdictional amount does have some effect on the vol-
ume of contract and other liquidated amount cases. It is clear,
however, that, standing alone, this effect is inadequate to justify
29. Year Federal Question Diversity
1957 8,220 23,223
1958 8,992 25,709
1959 8,437 17,342
1960 9,207 17,048
Statistics gathered from Table C-2, DmECTOR OF THE ADmInISTRATrV
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs ANw. REP. (1957-1960). These
figures should not be considered conclusive as to the effectiveness of
increasing the jurisdictional amount as a method of reducing the federal
caseload. Numerous other factors influence the volume of federal liti-
gation, such as alterations in jurisdiction over corporations, see note 27
supra, and continual expansion of federal question jurisdiction, see note
24 supra. The 1960 report of the Administrative Office, written after
Congress raised the jurisdictional amount, stated that "the courts in
1960 experienced about the same rate of increase as the annual average
over the years 1948 to 1958." DnEcTOR OF THE ADmISTRAT.E OFFICE
OF THE UMTED STATES CoURTs ANN. RE. 74 (1960). In the same year,
Chief Justice Warren stated that "while the jurisdiction act of 1958 ...
did result in a temporary reduction in the filings of private civil cases,
the net effect on the workload has been very slight." Address by Hon.
Earl Warren, Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, May 18,
1960, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960).
30. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178
(1936).
31. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938).
32. Congress has attempted to combat the inflated claim difficulty
by inclusion of the following in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332:
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise
made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff is
finally adjudged to be entitled to recovery less than the sum or
value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be
entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs, the district court
may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose
costs on the plaintiff.
The effectiveness of this provision is questionable since only in the
clearest case should the court find the existence of no colorable claim,
and in many of those cases Rule 12(h) (3) FED. R. Cnw. P., requires
the court to dismisp for lack of jurisdiction. See Friedenthal, New
Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 216 (1959).
[Vol. 53:94
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the existence of the requirement.
3. Protection of the Litigants Rationale
The jurisdictional amount requirement has also been de-
fended on the ground that it protects litigants against the in-
creased burdens and expenses of federal courts. 33
While this argument appealed to several courts in the past,34
and was undoubtedly valid with respect both to the costs of
appeal to the Supreme Court 35 and original jurisdiction, its
validity has diminished in modern times. Geographic accessibil-
ity to the federal courts is no longer a critical factor. While it
may affect the choice of forum,36 there is little evidence that
33. Congress has always been unwilling to permit suits for
small sums to be brought into its own courts, not because it
especially wanted to save the Courts labor, or even because it
wished to uphold their dignity, but principally, if not solely, for
the protection of litigants. When the amounts at issue are not
large, litigation in the federal courts may be unduly burden-
some.
J. ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE or THE FEDERAL COURTS 211 (5th ed.
1938). See also Note, supra note 10, at 201.
34. Thus all the safeguards, whether of protection of the courts
against the annoyance of numerous petty litigations, or of parties
against being burdened with the more inconvenient and expen-
sive proceedings of courts of the United States, would be effec-
tually destroyed.
Adams v. Douglas County, 1 F. Cas. 106, 107 (No. 52) (C.C.D. Kan. 1868)
(emphasis added). See also Chase v. Sheldon Roller-Mills Co., 56 F.
625-26 (N.D. Iowa 1893).
35. Warren, supra note 11, at 118-19.
36. See Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. REV. 933, 937-38 (1962), where
statistics gathered from questionnaires returned by 82 lawyers showed
the following about reasons for the choice of federal court:
Reason for Choosing Federal Court % of total responses
Geographical convenience 18.3
Broader discovery procedures 15.9
Federal juries render higher awards 14.0
Greater confidence in the independence andjudicial temperament of federal jurist 9.8
More current calendar 9.1
Federal juries superior 6.7
Choice made by client 6.7
On referral from an attorney who had
selected federal court . 4.9
Other 4.9
Local bias against nonresident client* 4.3
More congested calendar 1.8
Bias other than nonresidency 1.2
Greater familiarity with federal procedure 1.2
Availability of federal interpleader 1.2
100.0%
*Justification for federal diversity jurisdiction according to classical
theory.
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that choice is deliberately exercised with a view towards incon-
veniencing the opposition. Some of this undoubtedly exists,
but there is growing feeling that federal courts are no longer
more expensive or more burdensome than state courts:
Fees and costs in Federal courts are by no means excessive....
It is doubtful that these charges are now any higher than those
in most State courts. Furthermore, in the Federal courts there
is no jury fee as there is in many States, and there is adequate
provision for the conduct of cases "in forma pauperis" without
prepayment of fees or costs or charge for court reporting serv-
ices, a feature which not a few State courts lack. In recent
years the improvements in transportation facilities . . . have so
reduced the difficulties of travel as to make that objection seem
obsolete. .... 7
Moreover, the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should reduce the difficulties for an attorney who is unfamiliar
with federal practice.38
These factors demonstrate the weakness of justifying the
jurisdictional amount requirement on the ground that it saves
litigants from the burdens of suing in the federal judicial sys-
tem. While such a justification may have been valid 50 years
ago, modern reforms and conditions have undercut its plausi-
bility.
B. PRE-RULE JUIIciAL DEVLOPmENT OF AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS
The jurisdictional amount statutes have never expressly
dealt with the multiple party situation. The rules which govern
application of the jurisdictional amount requirement to joinder
of party cases have been entirely developed by judicial con-
struction. The development of these rules originated in cases
construing the amount requirement for appeal to the Supreme
Court.39 In Oliver v. Alexander,40 the Supreme Court dis-
missed an appeal against several seamen 41 whose individual re-
coveries were less than the requisite amount but whose total
recovery exceeded that sum. The Court reasoned that a rule
which allowed aggregation of the plaintiff seamen's judgments to
satisfy the statute would be oppressive, since an appeal against
37. 1957 Hearing at 12.
38. Id.
39. The jurisdictional amount requirement for such appeal was
repealed by the Judiciary Act of 1925. 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
40. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
41. The joinder was allowed under federal statute in such cases in
order "to save the parties from oppressive costs and expenses, and to
enable speedy justice to be administered to all who stand in a similar
predicament." Id. at 146.
[Vol. 53:94
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the judgment of any one of the seamen would mean that the
rest would be "dragged before the appellate tribunals and incur
enormous expenses, even when their rights and claims were be-
yond all controversy, and in truth, were not controverted."42 The
requirement of individual satisfaction of the jurisdictional
amount for appeal was upheld in a later case involving fifteen
plaintiff-respondents, only two of whom had received lower
court judgments which satisfied the statute. The appeal against
the remaining thirteen was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,43
without any attempt to distinguish the Oliver case.
The rigidity of the rulings involving the jurisdictional
amount requirement for appeal was relaxed in only one context.
Aggregation of separate claims for the purpose of satisfying the
appeal statute was permitted when the plaintiffs were claiming
a "common or undivided" interest in the recovery.4 4 The ex-
istence of identical facts or principles was not considered suffi-
cient grounds to justify abandonment of the traditional rule
against aggregation.45 Thus where several distributees of an
estate sued the administrator to compel payment of money al-
leged to be due them, the Court held there was jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, even though the amount payable to each dis-
tributee was less than the requisite amount.4 6 The Court rea-
soned that the matter in controversy was the sum due them
collectively since it was immaterial to the administrator how
it was shared among them:
He had no controversy with either of them on that point; and
if there was any difficulty as to the proportions in which they
were to share, the dispute was among themselves, and not with
him.47
The case was distinguished from Oliver on the ground that the
seamen in the latter were allowed to join only for the sake of
convenience, and not because their claims were in any sense
common. The Court noted:
... the right of each seaman is separate and distinct from his
associates. His contract is separate; and his recovery does not
42. Id. at 147.
43. Rich v. Lambert, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 347 (1851).
44. Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854).
45. See Note, Aggregation of Plaintiffs' Claims to Meet the Juris-
dictional Minimum Amount Requirement of the Federal District Courts,
80 U. PA. L. REV. 106 (1931). For a collection of cases applying the
common and undivided principle for original jurisdiction, see MooRE,
supra note 4. For a summary of the early aggregation cases see Gibson
v. Shufeldt, 122 U.S. 27 (1887).
46. Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854).
47. Id. at 5.
1968]
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depend upon the recovery of others, but rests altogether on its
own evidence and merits.48
In accord with this concept, two judgment creditors who joined
their respective claims to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of
property were not allowed to aggregate their judgments on the
ground that the interest of each was separate and distinct.
40
Walter v. Northeastern Railroad0 was the first Supreme
Court case which posed the problem of applying the jurisdictional
amount requirement to a multiple party lawsuit for the pur-
pose of determining the existence of original jurisdiction. In-
stead of analyzing the underlying distinctions between the juris-
dictional amount requirement in the context of appeals as op-
posed to the context of original jurisdiction,51 the Court simply
assumed that the early appeal cases were applicable to the issue
of original jurisdiction.52 Following this case the applicability of
the early decisions to cases involving both appellate and original
jurisdiction was apparently never questioned.5 3 The rule that
each party must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement, except where the claims were considered "common
or undivided," was generally followed:
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct de-
mands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is
essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdic-
48. Id.
49. Seaver v. Bigelows, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 208 (1866).
50. 147 U.S. 370 (1893).
51. It is generally agreed that the pri'mary purpose of the appellate
amount requirement is to protect the litigants. See Warren, supra note
11, at 118-19. As we have seen, there is no such agreement as to the
primary purpose of the original jurisdiction requirement.
52. 147 U.S. at 373-74. The Court's lack of analysis might have
been due to its preoccupation with the somewhat unusual fact situation.
Plaintiff railroad had filed a bill in equity to enjoin several defendants
from executing upon' plaintiff's property for purpose of tax collection.
The sum of the taxes due to all defendants was more than the requisite
amount, but no single defendant was claiming that amount. Thus the
issue of aggregation involved multiple defendants and a single plaintiff
rather than the more common multiple plaintiff-single defendant situa-
tion. The Court concentrated its attention on this factual distinction.
53. In Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901), the Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court decision which had stated:
It is clear . . . that the principles governing the right of an
appeal to the supreme court of the United States, in so far as
the amount is concerned, requisite to confer jurisdiction upon
the supreme court of the United States in such an appeal, are
the same as those involved in considering the amount requisite
to give jurisdiction to this court in an original proceeding.
Wheless v. City of St. Louis, 96 F. 865, 868-69 (E.D. Mo. 1899).
It should be noted that the aggregation principles, and the "com-
mon and undivided" distinction have been held equally applicable to
class actions. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
[VoI. 53:94
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tional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a
single title or right, in which they have a common and undi-
vided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal
the jurisdictional amount.5 4
III. THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
A. THE PoLICY
Because joinder of parties was difficult before adoption of
the Federal Rules, the judicial policy of dismissing from federal
court parties who could not individually establish a requisite
amount in controversy caused little dissatisfaction. The mere
existence of common questions of law or fact was generally
considered insufficient to justify joinder.55 Thus the early law
governing jurisdictional amount in the multiple party context
was largely developed in cases involving special statutory or ju-
dicial permission to join,rG or in cases litigated in equity. In
the latter, the question of whether a party could join turned on
his relationship to the other interests that were being asserted.57
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was pat-
terned after the early equity rules to the extent that joinder
of parties was permitted whenever the claims by or against
them arose from a common transaction or occurrence and in-
volved a common question of law or fact.58 The goals of the
Rules are, "settling at one time all the disputes of whatever
kind which exist between opposing parties or all questions in-
volving one affair, no matter how many parties may be af-
54. Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). The
rule has been followed in other Supreme Court decisions. Thomson v.
Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S.
594 (1916).
55. B. SiPamAN, CoImoN LAW PLEADING 364-66 (2d ed. 1895);
Clark & Moore, A New Federal Procedure II. Pleadings and Parties, 44
YALE L.J. 1291, 1319 (1935). As a general rule, courts held there could
be only one undivided judgment growing out of each multiple party
litigation, and that judgment could not be individualized to each party
plaintiff. If the action required individualized judgments, joinder was
not allowed. Jones & Carlin, Non-Joinder and Misjoinder of Parties in
Common-Law Actions, 28 W. VA. L. REv. 197 (1922).
56. See, e.g., Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
57. R. FosTER, 1 FEDERAL PRACTIcE 110 (2d ed. 1892). Rule 37 of
the 1912 Equity Rules provided:
All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and
in obtaining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs, and any
person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest
adverse to the plaintiff. ...
C. CLARK, CODE PLEADNG 252-53 (1928).
58. Individualized judgments were also allowed. See note 9 supra.
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fected;" 59 "saving of time of witnesses and parties and minimiz-
ing expenses of litigation;"'6 0 and "simplifying and reducing the
formal and permanent history of litigation.""' The funda-
mental conflict between these policies and the discouragement
of joinder which resulted from the old cases involving the juris-
dictional amount is unmistakable.
There are, however, indications that the Rules were not
intended to change the aggregation principles. Not only does
Rule 82 provide that the rules "shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts
• . ." but the act of Congress which empowered the Supreme
Court to promulgate the Rules provided that "said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant. '62 Moreover, Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a consul-
tant to the Advisory Committee which helped frame the Rules,
said when asked whether aggregation would be allowed under
the Rules when some but not all parties had satisfied the
amount requirement:
As confession is good for the soul, I am going to say I do not
know; but I am somewhat justified in that statement because
I do not believe this point has been passed upon under the new
Rules .... 63
Finally, while the Federal Rules are patterned after equity
rules which encouraged the settlement of claims in a single ac-
tion, many of the early developments in the construction of the
jurisdictional amount statutes, among them those forbidding
aggregation, occurred in equity cases.6 4  These developments
took place despite the recognition that joinder was for the con-
venience of the litigants as well as to save them expense.65
59. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22
A.B.A.J. 447, 449 (1936). See also Holtzoff, Foreward to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 6-7 (1966).
60. Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 534 (1936).
61. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last
Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provi-
sions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 976, 977 (1937).
62. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
63. A. HOL"ZOFF, PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL
PRocEDuRE 238-39 (1940). Judge Holtzoff further stated that in his
opinion each party still must satisfy the statute unless the parties are
asserting a joint or common right. These comments were aimed directly
at class actions, but since aggregation principles developed without dis-
tinction between joinder and class action cases, it seems clear that
Holtzoff's answer is equally applicable to both.
64. See notes 55-57 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Seaver v. Bigelows, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 208 (1866).
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B. POST-RULE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS
Since adoption of the Federal Rules, the majority of courts
have continued to apply traditional concepts. The leading case of
this type is Clark v. Paul Gray, Incorporated,66 where the Su-
preme Court held that several plaintiffs67 should have been dis-
missed in district court for failure to establish the requisite
amount in controversy, even though one plaintiff did satisfy the
requirement and was properly retained. The only reason given,
other than weight of authority, was that if the rule were other-
wise,
* . . an appellate court could be called to sustain a decree in
favor of a plaintiff who had not shown that his claim involved
the jurisdictional amount, even though the suit were dismissed
on the merits as to the other plaintiffs who had established thejurisdictional amount for themselves. 65
The adherence to the rules of the past has been justified
by lower courts in various ways. Some have simply relied on
the language in Healy v. Ratta,69 stating that the jurisdictional
amount statute must be strictly construed since it establishes a
political balance between federal and state functions." Others
have reasoned that since the Federal Rules expressly repudiate
any intent to extend federal jurisdiction,71 "the broad language
of Rule 20 ... which liberally allows permissive joinder of
claims, does not allow plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to
achieve the requisite jurisdictional amount .... -72 Still others
argue that regardless of purported equities, the goal should be a
rule which simplifies these "perplexing and constantly recurring
jurisdictional questions," and that traditional concepts best
serve this function.7 3
66. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
67. The California Caravan Act of 1937 imposed a license fee re-
quirement for transportation of vehicles into the state for purposes of
sale. The plaintiff joined in bringing suit seeking an injunction against
state officials charged with enforcing the Act.
68. Id. at 590. See also Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778
(5th Cir. 1963) and cases cited therein; Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940); Sobel v. National Fruit Product Co.,
213 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
69. 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
70. See, e.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 229 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1956).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
72. McCormick v. Labelle, 189 F. Supp. 453 (D. Conn. 1960). See
also Rompe v. Yablon, 277 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Colman v.
Pitzer, 160 F. Supp. 862, 864 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
73. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.
1956). Adherence to the past is also found in class action cases, where
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Some courts, however, have not been content with precedent
and have taken the position that the policy of the Federal Rules
compels a change in aggregation principles to support the goal of
litigating all common questions in a single suit regardless of the
number of parties involved. Several approaches have been taken
to reach this result: expansion of existing exceptions to the rule
against aggregation; application of doctrines previously limited
to other contexts; and creation of broad new rules.
1. Judicial Redefinition of Common and Undivided Interests
The exception to the rule against aggregation afforded those
parties asserting a "common and undivided" right7 4 has been
found by some courts to be a flexible rubric under which tradi-
tional nonaggregation rules can be avoided.7 5 For example, in
Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Company,7 6 plaintiff, seeking to try
his case in federal court, relied on the aggregation of his own
claim for personal injuries with a Wrongful Death Act claim for
the loss of his wife. Although traditionally considered two "sep-
arate" causes of action," it was held that the "common and un-
divided" doctrine "could, be stretched to cover the situation,"
since the plaintiff had a "definite interest" in any recovery
under either claim.7 8 This result was reached despite the Su-
preme Court's previous statement that "aggregation of plain-
tiffs' .claim cannot be made merely because ... the plaintiffs
-the courts allow aggregation under Rule 23(a) (1), the "true" class
action, Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939), but not under Rule 23 (a)
(2) "hybrid" or Rule 23(a) (3) "spurious" class actions. Alfonso v.
Hilisborough County Aviation Authority, 308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962);
Andrews v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 124 F.2d 788 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 682 (1941). The 1966 amendment to Rule
23 eliminated the "true," "hybrid" and "spurious" classifications, but
since there is no indication of intent to alter the aggregation principles,
it seems likely that courts will continue to apply the "true" versus "hy-
brid" and "spurious," or "common and undivided" versus "separate and
distinct" classifications. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins.
Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967); Snyder v. Harris, 268 F. Supp. 701
(E.D. Mo. 1967). Contra, Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp.
465 (N.D. Ill. 1967),
74. See notes 45-48 supra, and accompanying text.
75. Note, supra note 45. Although many cases have arguably vio-
lated the "common and undivided" principle, each case cited in this
section contains relatively clear indications that dissatisfaction with past
aggregation principles caused the particular interpretation of "common
and undivided."
76. 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
77. W. PnossER, LAw Or ToRTs § 120 (3d ed. 1964).
78. Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235, 236 (E.D.
Mich. 1960) (alternative holding).
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have a community of interest."7 9 In another case several em-
ployees, who had been issued stock purchased by the trustee of
their pension fund, were held to be asserting a "common or un-
divided" right when they sued the trustee for misuse of the
funds in purchasing the stock.80 The court was not deterred by
the obvious argument that each plaintiff was asserting a claim
based upon his interest in his own stock, completely apart from
the claims of the other parties, so that little more than a "com-
munity of interest" or common questions of law or fact existed.
Similarly, a court of appeals has held that the claims of several
children injured in a school bus were "common and undivided"
since the claims all arose from the same instrument-defend-
ant's insurance policy.81 In view of the Supreme Court's state-
ment that "aggregation of plaintiffs' claim cannot be made
merely because the claims are derived from a single instrument
• . .,,82 it is clear that dissatisfaction with traditional applications
of the jurisdictional amount requirement prompted the apparent
attempt to expand the "common and undivided" exception.
While it is true that the language of the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area did not compel contrary holdings on these
aggregation issues, such holdings would have been more consis-
tent with prior cases.
2. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The ancillary jurisdiction doctrine provides that federal
courts have the power to settle cases properly before them in
their entirety, even if this involves litigating matters which
would be beyond federal jurisdiction if asserted independently.8 3
Although its premise is that piecemeal litigation should be
avoided and complete justice rendered,8 4 ancillary jurisdiction
has traditionally been limited to cases where (1) the federal
79. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 447 (1942).
80. Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn.
1967).
81. Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coker, 219 F.2d 631 (4th
Cir. 1955). The alternative holding of the case was that when the chil-
dren received judgments exceeding the amount of the insurance policy,
a "common and undivided" right was created in them for the purpose
of the insurer's action for a declaratory judgment of nonliability on the
policy. See also Carnes & Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurancb Corp.,
101 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1939).
82. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 447 (1942) (emphasis added).
83. 1 W. BARRox & A. HoLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 23 (Wright ed. 1960).
84. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1955); Hoosier
Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 225-26 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
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court had actual or constructive control of property involved in
the litigation; 5 (2) federal jurisdiction was necessary to effec-
tuate the judgment on the matter over which the court had
jurisdiction;86 or (3) the ancillary matter had to be decided in
order to reach a conclusion with respect to the matter properly
within the courts' jurisdiction.8 7 Since adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the doctrine has been put to
new uses.8 It now represents the approach most often taken
to avoid traditional rules against aggregation. 9 If one party
asserts an amount in controversy exceeding the statutory require-
ment, other parties are often retained even though they do not
individually meet the requirement on the theory that their
claims are "ancillary" to the other. Property in possession of the
court or the necessity of protecting a federal judgment are no
longer requirements for application of ancillary jurisdiction.
The cases clearly illustrate the flexibility of the ancillary
jurisdiction doctrine. Where a plaintiff asserted two separate
claims, one on his own behalf and one on behalf of his wife's
estate, against the same defendant and one failed to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement, it was held that the federal
court should retain jurisdiction. The court reasoned that dis-
missal was unwarranted since the parties were the same in both
claims and since the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine permitted
retention of both claims if one satisfied the jurisdictional amount
requirement.9 0 The doctrine has also been used to support fed-
eral jurisdiction when plaintiff joined his own personal injury
claim with that of his living children and the latter failed inde-
pendently to satisfy the amount requirement.91 Nor is it a re-
quirement that the plaintiff be acting in a representative capac-
85. E.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
86. E.g., Hair v. Burnell, 106 F. 280 (8th Cir. 1900).
87. E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
88. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the
Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964). It is often argued that the Rules
did not expand ancillary jurisdiction, but merely increased the oppor-
tunity for its application. Id. at 28.
89. At least one pre-1938 case exists where the Court used ancil-
lary jurisdiction to avoid dismissal for failure to satisfy a jurisdictional
amount requirement. White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 (1895). However,
that case was based on the Court's authority to collect and administer
property, and was therefore consistent with the traditional restricted
use of the doctrine.
90. Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich.
1960). See also Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964).
For the court's alternative holding that the rights were "common and
undivided," see notes 78 and 79 supra, and accompanying text.
91. Wiggs v. Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821, 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
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ity, since ancillary jurisdiction has been used to retain an other-
wise improper loss-of-consortium claim by a husband which was
joined with a proper personal injury action by the wife.9 2 The
court maintained that this was not an extension of the cases
turning on the representative capacity of the plaintiff, since in
those cases the real parties in interest were the plaintiff and
the spouse's estate or the children, equally separate entities.9 3
Ancillary jurisdiction has also been used in the non-family con-
text. Thus, federal jurisdiction was retained over a case involv-
ing complaints by some thirty company employees for accrued
pension funds, even though some did not individually satisfy the
amount requirement.9 4
The ancillary jurisdiction cases have explained their circum-
ventions of the jurisdictional amount requirement in several
ways. Some cases reason that the purpose of the jurisdictional
amount is solely to check the number of cases coming into fed-
eral court. Satisfaction of the statute by any one of the parties
means the case must be retained regardless of whether those
failing to show $10,000 in controversy are dismissed. Thus it is
illogical to force litigation in both the state and federal courts,
especially in view of the intent of the Federal Rules to settle the
total controversy in a single suit.95 A different explanation is
used in cases involving more than one member of the same fam-
ily. In this situation, retention of all parties is justified by the
likelihood that they will have the same lawyer and that there
will be common elements of proof.9 6
92. Morris v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
See also Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967). Although
these cases speak of "pendent" jurisdiction, the issues presented more
properly should be categorized as "ancillary." See note 116 infra, and
accompanying text.
93. Id. at 986.
94. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
95. See Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964);
Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn. 1967);
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Wiggs v. Tulla-
homa, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Morris v. Gimbel Bros.,
246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186
F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount
Requirement and Joinder of Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 27 IND. L. REV. 199, 203-04 (1952).
96. See Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964);
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Wiggs v. Tulla-
homa, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Morris v. Gimbel Bros., 246
F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F.
Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960). This position has been accepted by the
American Law Institute in its study of state and federal jurisdiction.
The A.L.I. has recommended that whenever one member of the family
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Analogy to the discretion given district courts to permit
removal of an otherwise nonremovable claim when joined with
a properly removable claim97 has also been used to justify this
use of ancillary jurisdiction.98 Thus where several plaintiffs
brought an action in diversity arising out of an automobile acci-
dent, and not all could establish the requisite jurisdictional
amount, it was said to be illogical to disallow original jurisdic-
tion over some of the parties when the district court would be
authorized to take all claims on removal by defendants. 99
An analogy has also been noted between ancillary and pen-
dent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction permits federal courts to
retain jurisdiction over state claims whenever federal questions
are involved.10 0 The Supreme Court recently broadened the
scope of pendent jurisdiction by ruling that the state and federal
causes of action no longer have to involve "substantially identi-
cal" facts,' 0 ' but must merely derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact such that plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding. 10 2  This ruling, it is
argued, indicates that the Supreme Court may now look favor-
ably upon a similar extension of ancillary jurisdiction.10 3
Ancillary jurisdiction and the above justifications for its use
as a means of avoiding the rule against aggregation are open to
several criticisms. The doctrine is completely open-ended and
therefore of little predictive value, since there is no limitation on
its operation other than the court's interpretation of the "equi-
ties." This is evidenced by the extension of the doctrine from a
satisfies the jurisdictional requirements, any claim arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence asserted by another member of the fami-
ly living in the same household should be litigated in the same court,
regardless of its amount. ALI, STUDY OF THE DivIsOxN OF JURIsDIcTIoN
BETWEEN STATE Am FEDERAL COURTS, Part 1, § 1301(e) (official draft,
Sept 1965).
97. Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined
with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of
action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may re-
mand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964).
98. See Note, supra note 95, at 202-03.
99. Orn v. Universal Auto Ass'n, 198 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
Accord, Lauf v. Nelson, 246 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mont. 1965).
100. Hun v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
101. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 819-20 (S.D. Cal. 1947) and cases
cited therein.
102. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
103. See, e.g., Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558,
564-65 (1966).
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case where a single plaintiff joins his own claim with one which
he is asserting in a representative capacity,10 4 to the situation
where thirty employees join to recover pension rights.105
Also open to criticism is the argument that all parties should
be retained when one satisfies the statute because the basic pur-
pose of the jurisdictional amount is reduction of the volume of
federal litigation. In the first place, the log-jam rationale is by
no means the only justification for the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement. 06 Secondly, concern for the burden on federal courts
involves not only the number of cases, but also the time con-
sumed by those cases. 0 7 While it is true that a prerequisite for
joinder is that the claims must arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence, 08 and this somewhat mitigates the increased
burden of retaining all joined parties, there may still be issues
peculiar to particular parties, 0 9 the resolution of which will
104. Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich.
1960).
105. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
The courts could have reached the same result in the representative
cases without unreasonably expanding the reach of the ancilliary juris-
diction doctrine. Courts have consistently allowed aggregation of all
claims possessed by a single plaintiff See note 9 supra. An analogy
could have been drawn between joinder of claims by a single plaintiff
who owns each of the claims, and joinder of claims by a single plain-
tiff who possesses each claim for procedural purposes, even though he
owns but one. This analogy might be extended to the case of the plain-
tiff acting on behalf of other living parties, such as his children, see, e.g.,
Wiggs v. Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.Ij. Tenn. 1966), but would not
be susceptible to the same open-endedness as ancillary jurisdiction.
106. See notes 26-32 supra, and accompanying text.
107. Median time interval (in months) from issue to trial, for trials
completed in the United States district courts, fiscal years 1962 to 1966.*
Median Time Interval (in months)
Fiscal Year All trials Nonjury trials Jury trials
1962 109 - - 12
1963 10 9 12
1964. 11 11 -12
1965 11 9 12
1966 - 11 10 13
"From Axu REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADaVNIsmATiEVE OricE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 94 (1966).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
109. It could also be argued that double litigation could easily be
avoided if the district court would abstain from hearing the claims of
even those establishing the requisite jurisdictional amount, thus dis-
missing as to all parties, and leaving them free to join in an action in
state court. See Note, supra note 95, at 207-08 for this argument in
detail. While this would provide a partial solution to the whole diffi-
culty, it does not appear that the courts are willing to exercise absten-
sion powers in this context. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). More-
over, this approach might raise serious questions of deprivation of the
right of access to the courts.
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be time consuming.
The use of ancillary jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction over
relatives of a party who satisfies the amount requirement is
also susceptible to attack. The only distinguishing feature of
these family suits is the likelihood that the parties will be repre-
sented by the same attorney. The mere fact that the parties
are related is unlikely to mean that the proof will be identical.
Moreover, it might well be argued that a refusal to retain the
claims of related persons when one does not satisfy the amount
requirement is less prejudicial than such a refusal in the non-
family joinder context. A plaintiff trying to protect his inter-
ests against the collateral estoppel effect of another suit,"0 or
wishing to retain the advantage of having the jury consider his
claim in the context of all other claims arising from the com-
mon transaction or occurrence, might feel compelled to join his
claim with one being pursued in federal court. His dismissal for
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional amount seems harsher in cer-
tain respects than the dismissal of a husband's joined loss-of-
consortium claim, since there is presumably total cooperation of
control over the suit in the latter case. The husband and wife
could more readily agree to join their claims in state court,"'
thereby retaining whatever advantage there is in litigating the
claims together.
The analogy between ancillary jurisdiction and the discre-
tion of the district court to allow removal of an ordinarily non-
removable claim when joined with a proper federal cause of
action is not compelling, because it fails to account for the practi-
cal construction placed on the removal statute. Section 1441
110. Although it is normally said that due process of law forbids
application of collateral estoppel to an absent party, Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940), an exception is provided for those parties deemed
to be in privity with present parties. 'Privities" are said to include
"those who control an action although not parties to it ... ; those whose
interests are represented by a party to the action ... ; successors in
interest . . . ." Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
329 n.19 (1955), quoting RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a
(1942). Thus it is possible that fear of collateral estoppel, under certain
circumstances, might prompt a plaintiff to join in the federal action. See,
e.g., Morris Inv. Co. v. Moore, 332 Ill. App. 653, 75 N.E.2d 782 (1947)
(unsuccessful action by a government agency against a landlord to
enforce rent control legislation held to bind the tenant in a subsequent
action).
111. There is no real difficulty with joining claims in a state court,
as most states now have liberal joinder rules. Wright, Estoppel by Rule:
The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 39 IowA L. REV.
255 (1954).
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(c) 112 provides that the otherwise nonremovable claim must be
"separate and independent." The Supreme Court has ruled
that this language clearly indicates congressional intent to re-
quire "more complete disassociation between the federally cog-
nizable proceedings and those cognizable only in state courts be-
fore allowing removal." Thus if the claims arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence and involve common questions of law
or fact it "cannot be said that there are separate and indepen-
dent claims for relief as section 1441(c) requires."' 3 Since the
existence of claims arising from the same transaction or occur-
rence and involving common questions of law or fact is expressly
required for joinder under Rule 20, it appears that the analogy
and the cases relied upon are inapt." 4
Finally, the contention that the relaxation of pendent juris-
diction rules in the Gibbs" 5 case presages a similar relaxation
of ancillary jurisdiction rules is at best speculative. Ancillary
jurisdiction involves multiple claims arising from the same trans-
action or occurrence whereas pendent jurisdiction involves the
availability of parallel remedies to the wronged party."" Pen-
dent jurisdiction seems more closely analagous to aggregation of
claims asserted by a single plaintiff, which is clearly allowed,"17
than to retention of the claim of one plaintiff who has failed to
satisfy the federal jurisdictional requirements when joined with
that of another who has satisfied those requirements. Since
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are not the same, the Gibbs
decision stands only for the proposition that the Court, in the ab-
112. See note 97 supra.
113. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, $41 U.S. 6, 16 (1951).
The Reviser's note to § 1441(c) made it clear that the amendment to
the statute was restrictive rather than expansive, and that a reduction
in federal litigation was expected therefrom. 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Reviser's
Note. The Court's holding is also consistent with the traditionally re-
strictive construction of removal statutes in accordance with notions of
federalism in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934). See also Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
114. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 118 (1963). See generally Cohen,
Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and Independent Claim or
Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1961).
115. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
116. Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L.
REV. 383, 394 (1963).
Pendent jurisdiction, like ancillary jurisdiction, has been criticized
for its open-endedness. See, e.g., Shakman, The New Pendent Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968); Silberg,
Ancillary Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 12 J. AnI L. 288 (1941);
Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 51 IowA L. REv. 151 (1965).
117. See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
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sence of countervailing policies, will give weight to the conveni-
ence of the parties and factors of judicial economy.118
3. Breaking New Ground
At least one court has rejected all the traditional doctrines,
and has instead established a simple, but far-reaching rule. In
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation v. Chicago Title and Trust
Company," 9 the court, ignoring Supreme Court precedent and
ancillary jurisdiction, 120 fashioned the rule that where one of the
joined plaintiffs satisfies the amount requirement the court can
retain jurisdiction over all of the joined parties. Although recog-
nizing that reduction of the burden on federal courts and avoid-
ance of encroachment on state courts are among the reasons un-
derlying the jurisdictional amount requirement, 121 the court
failed to attribute sufficient significance to the latter. The court
stated that rather than encroaching upon the state courts, reten-
tion of jurisdiction over all parties, even those failing to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement, was "a service to the
generally overburdened state court."'1 2 2
While it is relevant to consider the burden on state courts
when making ultimate policy decisions,' 23 the court in Johns-
Manville apparently did not recognize that "encroachment" in
the federalism context of the jurisdictional amount statute in-
volves more than the question of whether the state courts ap-
preciate the efforts of the federal courts to lighten their case-
loads. Moreover, the decision established an absolute rule rather
118. The Court's refusal to grant certiorari in the ancillary juris-
diction cases should also not be construed as a change in judicial atti-
tude. If judicial silence indicates anything, it would be equally reason-
able to construe this silence to indicate judicial uncertainty regarding
the future of diversity as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without di-
versity these questions would become virtually moot because most fed-
eral questions have been provided for by statute without regard to an
amount requirement. The current ALI study on diversity was under-
taken upon the request of Chief Justice Warren, see Address by Hon.
Earl Warren, Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, May 18,
1960, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960), and recommended that diversity as a basis
for federal'jurisdiction be restricted. ALI, STUDY OF TnE DIrmsioN OF
Ju sIcTioN BEawrvv STATE AN FEDERAL COURTS (Official Draft, Sept.
1965).
119. 261 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
120. Although the court expressly stated otherwise, the decision has
been erroneously interpreted as resting upon ancillary jurisdiction. See
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 348 (D. Minn. 1967).
121. 261 F. Supp. at 907.
122. Id.
123. See note 134 infra.
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than following the ad hoe approach of the ancillary jurisdiction
cases, thus apparently removing even judicial discretion as a limi-
tation on aggregation. 124
It is submitted that the judicial attempts to avoid the rule
against aggregation have not proven satisfactory, since they have
created as many difficulties as they have solved. Although
based on a policy which is consistent with modem joinder phi-
losophies, their analyses have been shallow and the analogies
loosely drawn. Moreover, the divergent approaches of the vari-
ous courts have resulted in a total lack of consistency at the
trial court level. Thus litigants are unable to predict either
whether they will be allowed to remain in court, or what argu-
ment will be best received.
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACHES TO TEMPORARY AND
ULTIMATE SOLUTIONS
A. A TExmpoRRY SOLUTION
It is clear that nothing literally compels an abandonment of
the rule against aggregation of claims. Congress has not clearly
indicated any feeling that the premises which supported the
jurisdictional amount requirement in 1789 are no longer applica-
ble. The Supreme Court has failed to alter its traditional posi-
tion. The Federal Rules, while they establish a conflicting policy
of drawing all interested parties into the litigation, expressly
provide that they are not intended to extend federal jurisdiction.
Despite the argument that ancillary jurisdiction is not ex-
panded by the Rules, but rather that the Rules merely provide
new opportunities for applying the doctrine,' 25 the net effect is
an extension of federal jurisdiction-the very result which Rule
82 and the Rules Enabling Act forbid.
It is equally clear that the attempts by lower courts to avoid
precedent are not only a contravention of federal judicial rela-
tionships, but also a source of confusion, inequality and uncer-
124. As was pointed out in Rompe v. Yablon, 277 F. Supp. 662, 665
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), if forty bus passengers are injured in the same accident
and only one can properly allege damages in excess of $10,000, the other
39 may sue in federal court as well, even though their claims may be
very minor and the burden on the court is thereby increased. Ancillaryjurisdiction might not be applicable in such a case because judicial econ-
omy, a basic premise of the doctrine, is not served by retaining all
parties.
125. Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798, 803 (5th Cir. 1957); Lesnik v.
Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944); Foster v.
Brown, 22 F.R.D. 471 (D. Md. 1958); Note, supra note 95, at 205-06.
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tainty. For these reasons, it is suggested that new policy deci-
sions must come from the proper authoritative body, in this
case Congress or, more probably, -1 2 6 the Supreme Court. Until
these policy decisions are made, the rule that several parties
joined under Rule 20 and asserting separate and distinct de-
mands must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement
should be followed by all lower federal courts.
B. AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION
The time has arrived to reassess the factors which underlie
the jurisdictional amount requirement and to establish a system
of priorities for those factors. In this connection the following
suggestions are offered.
The fact that federalism was the basis of the amount re-
quirement in 1789 should not preclude a present day reevalua-
tion. Rigidly drawn lines between federal and state jurisdiction
are not everlasting, and must be altered when they frustrate
new and demanding considerations.12 7 As our society increases
in complexity, the various functions of the state and federal judi-
cial systems increasingly expand and contract. Evidence of this
is found in the expansion of state judicial power through
"long-arm" statutes, 128 and federal judicial power through the
Federal Interpleader Act.129  With the increasing overlap be-
tween federal and state jurisdiction due to the application of state
law by federal courts'30 and of federal law by state courts,' 3' and
the increasing uniformity of judicial standards due to uniform
laws and the fourteenth amendment decisions requiring equal
treatment at either the state or federal level, 13 2 the ancient lines
126. The Supreme Court is more likely to promulgate these policies
not only because of Congress' tendency to ignore judicially manufactured
technicalities, but also because any solution will be difficult to verbalize.
In this respect, a judicial opinion is much more flexible than a statute,
and can better deal with the relevant factors.
127. Cf. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499, 503 (1928).
128. Foster, Expanding Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents, 32 Wis. B.
BULL. 3-4 (Oct. 1959 Supp.).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
130. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1964).
131. This may occur, for example, when Congress creates a federal
right and provides for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, as it
did in the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
132. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (coerced confessions); Smith
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of demarcation between the two judicial systems have become in-
creasingly blurred.133
Similarly, the argument that strict interpretation of the ju-
risdictional amount requirement is justified because it reduces
the volume of federal litigation has become myopic. Judicial
economy is of the utmost importance, but it is time to recognize
that it is needed in state as well as federal judicial systems,
and that reduction of federal cases only increases the burden on
the states. 3 4 Thus any solution to the problems of the juris-
dictional amount requirement must necessarily involve consid-
eration of national judicial economy.135
The recognition that federal courts speak with total author-
ity only on matters involving federal law must be balanced
against considerations of national judicial economy. Thus the
federal courts should be free to concentrate upon these cases,
rather than becoming overburdened with cases requiring appli-
cation of state law, thereby forfeiting all opportunity for the
exercise of creativity. 36 It is therefore submitted that the
underlying premises of the jurisdictional amount requirement
should now be (1) national judicial economy and (2) controlled
reduction of federal litigation, and that these two factors must
be balanced by courts considering aggregation cases.
When none of the plaintiffs bringing an action in federal
court can individually establish the requisite amount in contro-
versy, assuming the claims are separate and distinct, the court
should dismiss them all. This would serve to reduce federal liti-
gation, and yet would not contravene the policy of national ju-
dicial economy, since the parties could litigate the entire case in
state court. When one or more of the plaintiffs establish the
requisite amount, the following two-step process is recom-
mended: (1) It should first be determined whether retention of
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (right to vote); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of expression).
133. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Juris-
diction, 63 McH. L. REv. 1203 (1965).
134. Chief Justice Warren made this clear when requesting the
American Law Institute to undertake a study of federal jurisdiction:
We must take care lest the State court systems become swamped
with litigation heretofore handled in the courts of the United
States and which the States have had every reason to assume
would continue to be handled there.
1959 AMERicAN LAW INSTUTE---PROCEEDINGs 27, 33. Neither the ALI
nor Congress has given much attention to this aspect of the problem.
135. "National judicial economy" means economy of judicial time
and talent in its entirety, without regard to whether the federal or state
judiciary benefits more.
136. ALI supra note 118, at 47.
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all parties would increase the burden on the federal court.
Since the claims must arise from the same transaction or occur-
rence, there will usually be no added burden, and the inquiry
will end there. However, it is superficial to conclude that the
burden will not increase simply because the court must hear
the case anyway,13 7 because the claim of each party may in-
dividually raise questions not common to all other parties.
(2) Assuming that retention of all parties would increase the
burden on the federal court, it then must be determined whether
the added burden is such that considerations of national judi-
cial economy no longer outweigh the desire to reduce the burden
on federal courts. Such a result would be proper if the collateral
issues were so diverse that national judicial economy would not
be sacrificed by sending all those failing to satisfy the statute
back to the state courts. 38
The above approach focuses on practical rather than phi-
losophical considerations. It presumes, and this must be decided
by Congress or the Supreme Court, that notions of federalism
can be suppressed to facilitate the growth of a coordinated, effi-
cient national judicial system. Although this solution places
broad discretionary powers in the court, the nature of the ques-
tions which must be decided dictates that this is the only ra-
tional approach available, and that the discretion is not as open-
ended as that presently being exercised under the rubric of
ancillary jurisdiction. Except where consideration of step two
is necessary, the suggested rule is more certain than the an-
cillary jurisdiction approach. Moreover, step two contains clearly
defined goals and factors to be placed in the balance, and these
impose certain limitations on the court's discretion.' 89
Thus, the scope of the joinder rule-that claims must arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence and involve common
questions of law and facti40-should define the scope of the
court's authority to retain all parties, provided at least one has
satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement. The only excep-
tions would be the infrequent cases where the court determines
137. See note 95 supra.
138. The dispositive considerations here do not include the conven-
ience of the litigants. That interest can best be served by the creation
of a smoothly functioning national judiciary.
139. Another potential difficulty lies in requiring the court to make
a pre-trial determination of the complexity of the issues which are
likely to be raised. In most cases, however, a reasonable determination
can be made from the pleadings, and if this proved inadequate, a hearing
could be provided.
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
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that retention of all parties would raise issues which would in-
crease the burden on the court to such an extent that two trials,
one in federal and one in state court, would not compromise
national judicial economy.
The suggested solution is doubly consistent with the joinder
of parties rule. Rule 20(b) allows the district courts to order
separate federal trials when the issues are sufficiently complex.
Step two of the suggested solution would grant a similar discre-
tion to order separate federal and state trials.
It is evident that such a test will alter the complexion of
cases which are retained by the federal courts. For example,
when forty passengers are injured in a bus mishap, only one of
whom can establish the requisite amount, the court might retain
the 39 other claims, even though none of them exceeds $200.14,
This avoids a double drain on national judicial time and tal-
ent, and can be justified on that ground alone. On the other
hand, a husband and wife might join in an action where each
claim raises such diverse issues that the court would be justified
in dismissing whichever claim failed to satisfy the statute.1 42
Regardless of the acceptability of the approach suggested
above the problem requires immediate attention. While lower
court compliance with Supreme Court precedent will remove
some confusion and inconsistency, only a general reconsidera-
tion of the factors discussed herein can lead to a sensible and
just solution.
141. Rompe v. Yablon, 277 F. Supp. 662, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
142. This would be appropriate in a case such as Raybould v.
Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960), where a hus-
band sued on his own behalf and joined a wrongful death action as
administrator of his wife's estate. If a "presumption of due care" stat-
ute, creating a presumption in favor of the deceased, had been involved,
then substantial issues would have been raised which were not relevant
to the husband's personal claim. See, e.g., Mm. STAT. § 602.04 (1967).
The same situation might arise if contributory negligence was an issue
for some parties and not others.
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